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We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with 
observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly under two possible time structures. In 
mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can 
never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play 
at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly.  In mixed duopoly there is 
multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity 
stage. These equilibrium outcomes are invariant with respect to the endogenous time structures. 
In this context, we also show that the public firm never chooses over (excess) capacity in mixed 
duopoly, while the private firm never chooses under capacity in both mixed and private duopoly.   
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1. Introduction 
Analysis of exogenous sequential choices of capacities followed by quantities in private 
oligopoly models has been extensively studied in the literature (see Spence (1977), Dixit (1980), 
Saloner (1985), Tirole (1988), Basu and Singh (1990) among many others). When it comes to 
endogenous choice and timing, the literature (see Gal-Or (1985), Boyer and Moreaux (1987), 
Dorwick (1986), Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Robson (1990), Pal (1998) Lu (2006) among 
others) so far has focused only on the endogenous choice of the quantity and/or price ignoring 
the endogenous choice and timing of capacity at the earlier stage of the game. Thus, the issue of 
endogenous timing at each stage of a two-stage game of capacity and quantity has been 
overlooked in the literature of oligopoly. However, we know that the choice/commitment of 
capacity prior to quantity or price in a strategic framework under exogenous timing has major 
implications on the market outcome. Keeping that view in mind, here we analyze the problem of 
strategic choices when all the timings of the relevant (strategic) variables at all the stages of the 
game are chosen endogenously in the model.   
  A two-stage game of endogenous timing with observable delay (a la Hamilton and Slutsky 
(1990)) is considered here in the context of sequential capacity and quantity choice. Two 
different types of market structures are used to analyze the problem. The first one is mixed 
duopoly (consisting of one private and one public firm), and the second one is private duopoly 
(consisting of two private firms). Two different market structures are considered to encompass 
the two different classes of models in oligopoly literature.
1 Two different versions of timing 
with respect to the choice of capacity and quantity are considered to see whether the equilibrium 
outcomes are invariant with respect to the endogenous time structures. The two different modes 
of timing give rise to two different extended games in the analysis. In one (say game A), firms 
first choose the timing of choosing their capacities and of choosing their quantities before the 
actual capacity and quantity choice. More specifically, a three-stage game is considered. In stage 
one (the pre-play stage), firms simultaneously announce in which period they will choose their 
capacities and in which period they will choose their quantities (when there are more than one 
                                                 
1 Besides many studies on private oligopoly, the study of mixed oligopolies has become increasingly popular over 
time (see, Cremer et al. 1989, DeFraja and Delbono 1989, Fjell and Pal 1996, Pal 1998, White 1997, Anderson et al. 
1997, Nishimori and Ogawa 2004 among others). Mixed oligopolies are common in many countries. Oil industries, 
heavy manufacturing industries, telecommunications or tourism industry are good examples of mixed oligopolies 
where the issue of capacity building prior to production and/or providing service is an important matter. 
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period to choose those strategic variables), and are committed to this announcement. In stage two, 
firms choose their capacities knowing when the other firm makes its capacity choice and when 
both firms make their quantity choices. After observing both firms’ capacity level, in stage three, 
firms choose their quantities knowing when the other firm makes its quantity choice. If both 
firms decide to choose capacity (quantity) in the same time period, a simultaneous game realizes 
at that stage, whereas if both firms decide to choose capacity (quantity) in different time periods, 
a sequential game arises in the stage game. In the second extended game (say game B), a four 
stage game is considered with two pre-play stages, namely, first and third. In the first stage, firms 
simultaneously only announce in which period they will choose their capacities (nothing is 
mentioned about the timing of quantity choice at this stage) and are committed to this 
announcement. In the second stage firms choose their capacities knowing when the other firm 
makes its capacity choice. In the third stage, after observing each firm’s capacity level, firms 
simultaneously announce with commitment in which period they will choose their quantities. 
Finally in stage four, firms choose their quantities knowing when the other firm makes its 
quantity choice. We analyze the endogenous timing decisions of capacities and quantities of the 
two competing firms in these two different versions of the game under a mixed duopoly and 
private duopoly; and characterize the set of all subgame perfect equilibrium (SPNE).   
  To some, the second form of the game (i.e. game B) may be more realistic than the first form 
(i.e. game A) because of the following reason. By nature capacity is a long-run variable and 
quantity is a short-run variable. A timing structure where a firm invests in capacity and then 
makes quantity decisions after reacting to rival’s capacity choice seems to be more appropriate. 
Nevertheless, for the theoretical completeness and to check whether equilibrium outcomes are 
invariant with respect to the endogenous time structures, we do the analysis under both types of 
timing. We expected the results in private oligopoly model to differ from mixed oligopoly. This 
is actually vindicated in our analysis.       
  In both game situations A and B, we prove that in a mixed duopoly a simultaneous play at 
each stage of the game (namely, the capacity stage and the quantity stage) can never be 
supported as SPNE of the extended game. This can only be supported as SPNE if the game is 
played between two private firms. We find out what type of order of moves between the public 
and the private firm can actually be supported as a part of SPNE in the mixed duopoly case. To 
this end, we find multiplicity of equilibria. All equilibria require sequentiality of the moves at   3
each stage of the game. We show that the following order of moves can be supported as a part of 
SPNE in a mixed duopoly in game A as well as game B. When the demand is sufficiently high, 
there are two SPNEs. In one SPNE, the public firm acts as a leader in both capacity and quantity 
stage. In the other SPNE, the public firm acts as a leader in the capacity stage, while the private 
firm acts as a leader in the quantity stage. These two equilibria always exist for all possible 
feasible range of market demand. The next two equilibria emerge when demand is medium or 
low. When the demand is medium, a third SPNE emerges in which the private firm acts as a 
leader in both the capacity and quantity stage and when the demand is sufficiently low, a fourth 
SPNE emerges in which the private firm acts as a leader in the capacity stage, while the public 
firm acts as a leader in the quantity stage.
2  In contrast to this, in game A as well as game B, in a 
private duopoly, we find a unique SPNE where both firms move at the first opportunity in the 
capacity as well as in the quantity stage resulting in a simultaneous play at each stage of the 
game. These strategic choices of the private duopolists also turn out to be the strictly dominant 
strategy.  
  Our analysis shows a wide variety of equilibria is possible under mixed duopoly depending 
on the strength of the demand whereas in a private duopoly there is unique equilibrium 
irrespective of the level of demand. Since these results are derived under both forms of extended 
games (A and B) of endogenous timing, they prove to be robust (i.e. invariant with respect to the 
endogenous time structures) as well.
3 
  In the models with exogenous timing, the strategic choice of excess capacity or under 
capacity by the competing firms is always an issue that is examined carefully in the literature 
(see Dixit (1980), Bulow et. al. (1985), Tirole (1988) among others) of private oligopoly. In our 
framework of endogenous choice under mixed and private oligopoly, we find the following 
result.    The public firm never chooses over capacity, while the private firm never chooses under 
capacity in any outcome (equilibrium or not) in both forms of the game.   
                                                 
2 This is to say, when the demand is medium, there are three subgame perfect equilibria; there are four when the 
demand is low. 
3  Recently Nishimori and Ogawa (2004) considered a sequential two-stage game of mixed duopoly where capacity 
is chosen first followed by the choice of quantity. They consider a particular order of exogenous moves, namely, 
both firms choose capacity simultaneously first and then choose quantity simultaneously. As it is mentioned earlier, 
in this analysis we find that both firms moving simultaneously at each stage of the game will never be realized in 
equilibrium if the order is chosen by the firms endogenously.   
   4
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we analyze game A under 
mixed and private duopoly. In section 3, we analyze game B under mixed and private duopoly. 
The issue of excess capacity and under capacity under both forms of the game is addressed in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes.       
 
2. Game A 
2.1 Mixed Duopoly 
A mixed duopoly market is considered with one public firm and one private firm, both 
producing a single homogeneous good. The market price is determined by the inverse demand 
function ) ( b a q q a Q a p + − = − = , where p is market price, Qis total output and  i q  denotes 
the output of firm  i  () , ab = . Firm a is a profit-maximizing private firm, and firm b is a public 
firm maximizing the social surplus (welfare) which is defined as the sum of consumer surplus 
and both firms’ profits. 
We specify the following quadratic cost function: 
2 ) ( ) , ( i i i i i i i x q q m x q C − + = , where  i q   
is the production quantity and  i x  is capacity scale (say, plant size) of firm  i () , ab = .
4 Under 
this U-shaped cost function, the long-run average cost is minimized when quantity equals 
production capacity. It is clear that as long as the capacity scale is bounded above, then by 
assuming a sufficiently large  i m , we can ensure that marginal cost is always positive for any 
0 i q ≥ . We assume b a m m < ; that is, private firm a can produce more efficiently than public firm 
b at the efficient production-capacity level.
5 In this context, we also define excess (over) 
capacity and under capacity in the following manner. In the product market competition stage 
(i.e. the last stage of the game), if  ii x q > , then the corresponding firm observes over capacity; 
whereas if  ii x q < , then the firm observes under capacity. 
                                                 
4  Quadratic cost functions are used in various models including Spencer and Brander (1992) and Vives (1986). Here 
we take a particular parametric form of cost function for its tractability. Same cost structure is used in Horiba and 
Tsutsui (2000), and Nishimori and Ogawa (2004). 
5  Note that  ab mm ≥ will yield zero profit for the private firm. We also assume a market with enough demand for 
the good i.e.  4( ) bb a am m m −≥ − , to ensure all the capacities and quantities chosen by the firms under different 
scenarios are all nonnegative. This constitutes our feasible range of demand in the whole forthcoming analysis.    5
The objective functions of firm a and firm b  a r e   g i v e n   b y             
2 ) ( a a a a a a x q q m pq − − − = π and  b a
Q
SS π π + + =
2
2
 respectively, where 
2
2 Q
is the consumer 
surplus. 
Recall that we consider a three stage game here. The first stage is the announcement stage, 
the second stage is the capacity stage and the third stage is the quantity stage (i.e. the product 
market competition). We assume there are two time periods for choosing capacities and two time 
periods for choosing quantities.
6 That is, at the capacity (quantity) stage, each firm can choose 
capacity (quantity) in the first period (i.e. at the first opportunity and rule out the possibility of 
being a follower in that stage) or in the second period (i.e. at the last opportunity and rule out the 
possibility of being a leader in that stage). Thus, there are four possible strategies for each firm: 
(F, F), (F, S), (S, F) and (S, S), where F and S represent first period and second period with 
regard to capacity and quantity choice respectively. That is, the first component in each bracket 
corresponds to the timing of capacity choice whereas the second component corresponds to the 
timing of quantity choice of each firm. For example, (F, S) represents a choice where capacity is 
chosen in the first period at the capacity stage while the quantity is chosen in the second period at 
the quantity stage by the same firm. Under this circumstance, three types of games with regard to 
order of moves can realize. Type I, purely simultaneous play; type II, purely sequential play; and 
type III, a combination of simultaneous and sequential play. Type I corresponds to 4 cases where 
both firms choose capacity simultaneously (in stage two) and quantity simultaneously (in stage 

















b)); where superscript “a” refers to private 
firm and “b” refers to public firm. Notice that all these cases are observationally equivalent. Thus, 
it would suffice to analyze any one of them. Type II corresponds to 4 outcomes as well, but they 
are all distinct, i.e. none of them are observationally equivalent. They are as follows. (i) Public 





Public leader-Private leader (i.e. the public firm is the leader in the capacity stage and the private 




b)); (iii) Private leader-Public leader (i.e. 
the private firm is the leader in the capacity stage and the public firm is the leader in the quantity 
                                                 
6  Note that for two competing firms, two time periods at each (capacity and quantity) stage are enough to consider 










b)). Finally type III corresponds to a combination of simultaneous 
and sequential play. Type III can be divided into two categories (i) when capacity stage is 
simultaneous, (ii) when quantity stage is simultaneous. Category (i) has got 4 cases; two pairs of 


















b)); we call them Cournot-Public leader. Category (ii) 









b)), called Private leader-Cournot and other two 








b)), called Public 
leader-Cournot. Effectively in categories (i) and (ii), we have 4 distinct cases. Thus, we need to 
study 9 (=1 + 4 + 4) distinct types of order of moves of the game that can be played between the 
two firms.
7 Notice that in total there are 16 outcomes of the complete extended game. Our 
objective is to solve the SPNEs of this extended game using backward induction.   
 
2.2 Results under Mixed Duopoly 
Using backward induction, we obtain each firm’s payoff in different strategy combinations. 
All the calculations are straightforward, so we omit them. The normal form of the extended game 
is represented in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Examining Table 1 yields the following four SPNEs:
8 














b)). But this is a constrained SPNE only 
when demand is sufficiently low, specifically, when  7.584( ) bb a am m m − ≤− . 
                                                 
7 As we have mentioned before, Nishimori and Ogawa (2004) considered the Cournot-Cournot case. Also Lu and 
Poddar (2005) discussed the following four cases: Public leader-Cournot, Private leader-Cournot, Cournot-Public 
leader, and Cournot-Private leader. 
8  For proof, see Proposition 1 later.   7




b)). But this is a constrained SPNE only 
when demand is low or medium, specifically, when  15.75( ) bb a am m m − ≤− . 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Proposition 1: Both the public firm and the private firm choosing capacities simultaneously 
and/or choosing quantities simultaneously cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome.   
Proof: The entries on the main diagonal of the matrix (i.e.  ( ) , ijwhereij = ) in Table 1, refers to 
the payoffs of the simultaneous moves of firms at each of the capacity and quantity stage. We 
observe that there is no Nash  equilibrium  on  the  main  diagonal.         
  
  It is interesting to note here that Pal (1998) demonstrated that all firms choosing quantities 
simultaneously in a mixed oligopoly cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome. In this framework, 
we show that the result can be extended where the capacity is also endogenously chosen before 
quantity. The public firm and the private firm will never choose capacities (or quantities) 
simultaneously in any SPNE of this game.   
 
Proposition 2: When demand is sufficiently high, there are two SPNEs. In one equilibrium, the 
public firm acts as a leader in both the capacity and the quantity stage. In the other equilibrium, 
the public firm acts as a leader in the capacity stage and the private firm acts as a leader in the 
quantity stage. When demand is medium, a third SPNE emerges in which the private firms acts 
as leader in both the capacity and quantity stage. When demand is sufficiently low, a fourth 
SPNE emerges in which the private firm acts as a leader in the capacity stage, while the public 
firm acts as a leader in the quantity stage. 
Proof: See Table 1, 2 and Appendix 1. 
 
Thus, we find that each entry of the other diagonal of the matrix, i.e. each entry in (4, 1); (3, 
2); (2, 3) and (1, 4) in Table 1, constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the corresponding strategy 
pairs, two of which depend on the demand. Notice that all those entries correspond to purely 
sequential move games. In other words, all possible (subgame perfect) equilibria are essentially 
the outcomes of sequential moves.     8
Now, we focus our attention to the intuition behind the equilibria obtained here. Firstly, 
why is the “private leader-private leader” outcome not a SPNE when demand is sufficiently high? 
It is because the public firm prefers to choose capacity simultaneously when the demand is 
sufficiently high given that the private firm acts as a leader in the third stage. If the private firm 
acts as a leader in the second stage, then its capacity choice will be high enough so that the 
public firm chooses zero capacity. In the third stage, the public firm produces little, the total 
output is not large, and the difference between the public firm’s quantity and its capacity 
increases in demand. On the contrary, if the public firm deviates to choose capacity 
simultaneously with the private firm, then its capacity is positive. In the third stage, the public 
firm produces more, the total output is larger, and the difference between the public firm’s 
quantity and its capacity is smaller. So, for the public firm, there is a trade off between the 
increases in consumer surplus, the reduction in the difference between quantity and capacity, and 
the increases in production costs. When the demand is not high, the gain resulting from deviation 
is less than the loss; hence, the public firm will not deviate. When the demand is high, the gain 
resulting from deviation exceeds the loss; hence, the public firm will deviate. 
Similar reasons can explain why “private leader-public leader” outcome is SPNE only when 
demand is sufficiently low. This also explains why we get “public leader-public leader” and 
“public leader-private leader” as the two equilibria for all possible ranges of demand.   
 
2.3 Private Duopoly 
Now consider two private firms play the same observable delay game (i.e. game A). The 
demand function and cost function are the same as in the mixed duopoly case except that now 
the two firms are equally efficient, that is,  m m m b a = = . Again, there are four possible strategies 
for each firm: (F, F), (F, S), (S, F) and (S, S). But since the two firms are symmetric, here we 
have 5 distinct cases to consider: Cournot-Cournot {((F, F), (F, F)); ((F, S), (F, S)); ((S, F), (S, 
F)); ((S, S), (S, S)) i.e. all possible simultaneous plays}; Cournot-Stackelberg {((F, F), (F, S)); 
((F, S), (F, F)); ((S, F), (S, S)); ((S, S), (S, F)) i.e. all simultaneous then sequential plays}; 
Stackelberg-Cournot {((F, F), (S, F)); ((F, S), (S, S)); ((S, F), (F, F)); ((S, S), (F, S)) i.e. all 
sequential then simultaneous plays}; Repeated leadership in both stages {((F, F), (S, S)); ((S, S), 
(F, F)) i.e. sequential plays with  same leader in both stages}; and Alternative leadership {((F, 
S), (S, F)); ((S, F), (F, S)) i.e. sequential plays with different leaders in each stage}. These are the   9
16 possible outcomes of the game. As before, we would like to solve for the SPNE of the 
extended game. The normal form of the extended game is represented in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Examining the table, we find that (F, F) is the strictly dominant strategy of each of the two 
firms. In other words, both the firms would like to move in the first opportunity at the capacity as 
well as the quantity stage of the game. Thus, ((F, F), (F, F)) becomes the unique dominant 
strategy equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 3: In a private duopoly where capacities and quantities are chosen sequentially and 
endogenously, both firms choose capacities and quantities simultaneously in each stage at the 
very first opportunity (irrespective of other player’s move); thus resulting in a unique dominant 
strategy equilibrium ((F, F), (F, F)). 
 
3. Game B 
Here, as mentioned earlier, we consider a four stage game with two pre-play stages, namely, 
first and third. In the first stage, firms simultaneously only announce in which period they will 
choose their capacities (nothing is mentioned about the timing of quantity choice at this stage) 
and are committed to this announcement. In the second stage firms choose their capacities 
knowing when the other firm makes its capacity choice. In the third stage, after observing each 
firm’s capacity level, firms simultaneously announce with commitment in which period they will 
choose their quantities. In stage four, firms choose their quantities knowing when the other firm 
makes its quantity choice. 
 
3.1 Mixed Duopoly 
We solve the game by backward induction. 
3.1.1 Endogenzing the Timing of Quantity Choice 
First, we obtain each firm’s payoff in the following three different situations. 
1) Simultaneous move   10
22 2 2
2
2 4 8 4 81 61 824 9 8 1
121 12 72 24 24 8 48 8
ab aba ba b S
a
ab a a a b b a b b a b
am am ax ax m m x x
mm mx mx mx mx xx a
π
⎛⎞ −+ +− + + − + ⎜⎟ =




56 62 112 124 42 45 74 62 1
242 28 168 56 56 180 112 59
abab a b a b S
ab a a a b b a b b a b
am am ax ax m m x x
SS
mm mx mx mx mx xx a
⎛⎞ −−+ + + + − − ⎜⎟ =
⎜⎟ −− ++− −+ ⎝⎠
. 
The superscript “S” denotes “simultaneous move”. 
2) Public leader 
22 2 2
2
384 128 768 256 288 32 697 128 1
1849 192 1152 384 384 128 768 128
abab a b a b F
a
a b aa ab ba bb ab
am am ax ax m m x x
mm mx mx mx mx xx a
π
⎛⎞ −++−+ + − + ⎜⎟ =




20 22 40 44 15 16 26 22 1
86 10 60 20 20 64 40 21
ab a b a b a b L
a b aa ab ba bb ab
am am ax ax m m x x
SS
mm mx mx mx mx xx a
⎛⎞ −−+++ + − − ⎜⎟ =
⎜⎟ −−++−− + ⎝⎠
. 
The superscripts “F” and “L” denote “follower” and “leader” respectively. 
3) Public follower 
22 2 2
2
12 4 24 8 9 24 4 1
60 63 6 1 2 1 24 2 4 4
ab a b a ba b L
a
a b aa ab ba bb ab
am am ax ax m m x x
mm mx mx mx mx xx a
π
⎛⎞ −+ +− + + − + ⎜⎟ =




36 38 72 76 27 28 42 38 1
150 18 108 36 36 112 72 37
ab a b a b a b F
ab a a a b b a b b a b
am am ax ax m m x x
SS
mm mx mx mx mx xx a
⎛⎞ −−+++ + − − ⎜⎟ =
⎜⎟ −− ++− − + ⎝⎠
. 
After that, we solve for the Nash equilibria in the subgame of the endogenous timing of 
quantity choice. To find the Nash equilibria, we need to do the following comparisons: 
()
2 13
23 6 2 0
18150
SF
ab a b SS SS a m m x x −= − − + + − < , 
()
2 1
23 6 2 0
10406
LF
ab a b SS SS a m m x x −= − + + − > , 
()
2 174
23 6 2 0
223729
SF
aa ab a b amm x x ππ −= − − + +− < , 
()
2 1
23 6 2 0
7260
LS
aa ab a b amm x x ππ −= − ++ − > .   11
We find two Nash Equilibria (NE) in the subgame of the endogenous timing of quantity 
choice: (I) public leader, private follower; (II) private leader, public follower. 
 
3.1.2 Endogenzing the Timing of Capacity Choice 
If the NE in the subgame of endogenous timing of quantity choice is (I), we can obtain a 
payoff matrix, the four entries of which are the (2,1), (2,3), (4,1), (4,3) entries of the payoff 
matrix in Table 1. From there we find the following. 
  (1) The public firm acting as a leader in both stages is always a SPNE. 
  (2) The private firm acting as a leader in capacity choice stage and the public firm acting as 
a leader in quantity choice stage is a SPNE when the demand is low, specifically, when 
7.584( ) bb a am m m −≤ − . 
    If the NE in the subgame of endogenous timing of quantity choice is (II), we can obtain a 
payoff matrix, the four entries of which are the (1,2), (1,4), (3,2), (3,4) entries of the payoff 
matrix in Table 1. From there we find the following. 
  (1) The public firm acting as a leader in capacity choice stage and the private firm acting as 
a leader in quantity choice stage is always a SPNE. 
  (2) The private firm acting as a leader in both stages is a SPNE when the demand is low or 
medium, specifically, when  15.75( ) bb a am m m −≤ − . 
Thus, the findings under mixed oligopoly in game B are same as the findings in game A. 
 
Proposition 4: Same as in proposition 1 and 2. 
 
3.2 Private Duopoly 
3.2.1 Endogenzing the Timing of Quantity Choice 
Again, we obtain each firm’s payoff in the following three different situations. 
1) Simultaneous move 
( )
22 2 2 1
96 24 96 24 97 8 64 36 18 18
225
S
aa b a b a b a b ax ax mx mx x x x x am a m π =− − + − + − − + + , 
( )
22 22 1
24 96 24 96 8 97 64 36 18 18
225
S
ab a b a b a b b ax ax mx mx x x x x am a m π =−+ + − + −− −++ . 
2) Firm b is the leader, firm a follower   12
( )
22 2 2 1
660 176 660 176 668 64 480 242 121 121
1568
F
aa b a b a b a b ax ax mx mx x x x x am a m π =− − + − + − − + + .
( )
22 2 2 1
12 48 12 48 4 48 32 18 9 9
112
L
ba b a b a b a b ax ax mx mx x x x x am a m π =− + + − + −− −+ + . 
3) Firm a is the leader, firm b follower 
( )
22 22 1
48 12 48 12 48 4 32 18 9 9
112
L
aa b a b a b a b ax ax mx mx x x x x am a m π =− − + − + − − + +  
( )
22 22 1
176 660 176 660 64 668 480 242 121 121
1568
L
ba b a b a b a b ax ax mx mx x x x x am a m π =− + + − + −− −++ . 
To find the Nash equilibria in the subgame of the endogenous timing of quantity choice, we 
need to do the following comparisons: 
() ( )
1
3 3 2 8 333 333 898 232 0
352800
SF
aa a b a b amx x a m x x ππ −= − −+ − + − > , 
()
2 1
33 8 2 0
25200
LS
aa a b amx x ππ −= −+− > , 
() ( )
1
3 3 8 2 333 333 232 898 0
352800
SF
ba b a b b amx x a m x x ππ −= − +− − − + > , 
()
2 1
33 2 8 0
25200
LS
ba b b amx x ππ −= −− + > . 
We find choosing F is dominant strategy for each firm, so there is only one NE in this 
subgame. 
 
3.2.2 Endogenzing the Timing of Capacity Choice 
We can obtain a payoff matrix, the four entries of which are the (1,1), (1,3), (3,1), (3,3) 
entries of the payoff matrix in Table 4. From there we find that choosing F is dominant strategy 
for each firm. So there is only one SPNE in which both firms choose F in both stages. 
Thus, the findings under private oligopoly in game B are same as the findings in game A. 
 
Proposition 5: Same as in proposition 3. 
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4. Over Capacity and Under Capacity 
The issue of over (excess) or under capacity is extensively studied in oligopoly models 
when capacity and quantity is chosen exogenously in sequential manner. Here, we study whether 
the competing firms end up with over capacity or under capacity in the equilibrium as a result of 
endogenous strategic choice.   
  We list the capacity and quantity choices by the firms in all possible outcomes of the games 
(A and B) in Table 4 for mixed duopoly.
9 Notice that in both forms of the games, the optimal 
choices of capacities and quantities by the competing firms are exactly the same. Thus, we have 
the following general result regarding over and under capacity in these two-stage games of 
endogenous capacity and quantity choice. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Proposition 6: In a mixed duopoly where capacities and quantities are chosen sequentially and 
endogenously, the public firm never chooses over capacity, while the private firm never chooses 
under capacity.     
 
Since the private firm is more efficient, the public firm tries to make the private firm produce 
more while it produces less. Hence, the public firm reduces its own capacity so that the private 
firm can produce more. Meanwhile, enlarging the production share in the market is desirable for 
the private firm. Thus, the private firm chooses over capacity while the public firm chooses under 
capacity as a strategic device. We find that as long as the private firm produces more efficiently 
than the public firm, the public firm does not carry idle capacity and the private firm does not 
choose under capacity regardless of the order of moves. 
 
Now, we list the capacity and quantity choices by the two firms in all possible outcomes of 
the games in Table 5 for private duopoly.   
 
[Table 5 about here] 
                                                 
9  The table helps us to summarize the main result.   
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We find that under both forms of the game firms choose always over (excess) capacity in all 
the cases, except the quantity stage leader in the Cournot-Stackelberg case and the quantity stage 
leader (who is also the capacity stage follower) in the Alternative leadership case, where it 
chooses exact capacity.   
 
Proposition 7: In a private duopoly where capacities and quantities are chosen sequentially and 
endogenously, the firms never choose under capacity. Except two cases firms always choose 
excess capacity.   
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we consider endogenous order of moves in the observable delay game of 
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in the context of a two stage game of capacity and quantity setting 
mixed and private duopoly. Firms first choose the timing of choosing their respective capacities 
and quantities before the actual capacity and quantity choices. Two different forms with respect 
to the choice of the timings of the strategic variables are considered. We derive all SPNEs under 
these two different forms. We find that the results are invariant with respect to the endogenous 
time structures. In mixed duopoly the public firm and the private firm choose capacity and 
quantity sequentially in all possible SPNEs and no simultaneous capacity or quantity choice case 
can be a part of SPNE. Multiple SPNEs are identified and characterized. We highlight the 
endogenous leader-follower relationship between the public firm and the private firm that arises 
in all possible equilibria. In contrast to this, in private duopoly, we find unique dominant strategy 
equilibrium where both the firms move simultaneously in the first opportunities at each stage of 
the game. Regarding the choice of capacity, we find that the public firm never chooses over 
(excess) capacity, while the private firm never chooses under capacity in both forms of the game. 
  We have done our analysis in the mixed duopoly situation where there is one public and one 
private firm. A natural extension to this would be to look into a situation where there are more 
private firms competing with a public firm. Pal (1998) analyzed this case when ‘only quantity’ is 
chosen endogenously and found out that all private firms produce simultaneously in period one 
and the public firm produces in a subsequent period when firms can potentially choose quantities   15
in several periods.
10 Now an analysis with multiple firms, say n firms ( 3 n ≥ ), inevitably opens 
up the possibility of choosing the strategic variable(s) in ( 3 n ≥ ) time periods. Now when more 
than one strategic variable choice is involved (like in our case here, when both the capacity and 
quantity are strategic choice variables) the problem becomes complex. A different approach 
other than one we adopted here would be worth pursuing. 
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2 
The first two SPNEs (namely, on the main diagonal of Table 1 with the coordinates ((4,1) and 
(3,2)) are easily verified. Here, we will prove the third SPNE (coordinates (2, 3)) and the fourth 
one (coordinates (1, 4)) are constrained SPNE. 




b)), a constrained SPNE only 
when 7.584( ) bb a am m m −≤ − i.e. when demand is low.
11 
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The public firm has no incentive to deviate when 
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b)), a constrained SPNE only 
when 15.75( ) bb a am m m −≤ − i.e. when demand is low or medium. 
                                                 
11  Note that we have already assumed  4( ) bb a am m m −≥ − . See footnote 4.   18
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Where,  
* A=  []
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Table 2: SPNEs under different demand level 
 
High 
) ( 75 . 15 a b b m m m a − > −  
Medium 
) ( 75 . 15 ) ( 584 . 7 a b b a b m m m a m m − ≤ − ≤ −
Low 
) ( 584 . 7 ) ( 4 a b b a b m m m a m m − ≤ − ≤ −
Public leader-Public 
leader 
Public leader-Public leader  Public leader-Public leader 
Public leader-Private 
leader 
Public leader-Private leader  Public leader-Private leader 
  Private leader-Private leader  Private leader-Private leader 
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2 ) ( 1088 . 0 m a − , 
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2 ) ( 0755 . 0 m a − , 
2 ) ( 1125 . 0 m a −  
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2 ) ( 1088 . 0 m a −  
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Table 4: The public firm and the private firm’s capacity scale and quantity level 
 
Outcome  Public firm’s capacity  Private firm’s    capacity  Public firm’s quantity  Private firm’s quantity 
(1) Cournot 
-Cournot 
a b m m a 2 3 + −  7 / ) ( 12 a b m m −   a b m m a 2 3 + −  
7 / ) ( a b m m − +  
7 / ) ( 11 a b m m −  
(2) Cournot 
-Public leader 
b m a −  
89 / ) ( 215 a b m m − −  
89 / ) ( 192 a b m m −   b m a −  
89 / ) ( 215 a b m m − −  
89 / ) ( 172 a b m m −  
(3) Cournot 
-Private leader 
b m a −  
4 / ) ( 9 a b m m − −  
8 / ) ( 15 a b m m −   b m a −  
8 / ) ( 17 a b m m − −  
8 / ) ( 15 a b m m −  
(4) Public leader 
-Cournot 
b m a −  
247 / ) ( 830 a b m m − −  
247 / ) ( 588 a b m m −   b m a −  
247 / ) ( 733 a b m m − −  
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Table 4: The public firm and the private firm’s capacity scale and quantity level (continued) 
 
Outcome  Public firm’s capacity  Private  firm’s 
capacity 
Public firm’s quantity  Private firm’s quantity 
(5) Private leader 
-Cournot 
0 
) 14 45 31 (
28
1
a b m m a + −
 
14 / ) ( b m a −  14 / ) ( 11 b m a −  
(6) Public leader 
-Public leader 
b m a −  




a b m m −   b m a −  




a b m m −  
(7) Public leader 
-Private leader 
2 / ) ( 9 a b b m m m a − − −  ) ( 3 a b m m −  ) ( 4 a b b m m m a − − −  ) ( 3 a b m m −  
(8) Private leader 
-Public leader 
0 
) 5 16 11 (
10
1




b m a −  
(9) Private leader 
-Private leader 
0 
) 9 28 19 (
18
1
a b m m a + −   18 / ) ( b m a −  6 / ) ( 5 b m a −    25
 
Table 5: Private firms’ capacity scale and quantity level   
Outcome  Firm a’s capacity  Firm b’s capacity  Firm a’s quantity  Firm b’s quantity 
(1) Cournot-Cournot  () 43 / 16 m a−   ( ) 43 / 16 m a−   ( ) 43 / 15 m a−   ( ) 43 / 15 m a−  
(2) Cournot- 
Stackelberg (firm a 
as a leader) 
() 21 / 8 m a−   ( ) 14 / 5 m a−   ( ) 21 / 8 m a−   () 3 / m a−  
(3) Stackelberg 
(firm a as a 
leader)-Cournot 
() 3137 / 1456 m a−   ( ) 3137 / 1072 m a−   ( ) 3137 / 1261 m a−   ( ) 3137 / 1005 m a−  
(4) Repeated 
leadership (firm a as 
a leader) 
() 2987 / 1456 m a− ( ) 5974 / 1905 m a−   ( ) 2987 / 1336 m a−   ( ) 2987 / 889 m a−  
(5) Alternative 
leadership (firm a as 
a follower in 
capacity stage and a 
leader in quantity 
stage) 
() 23 / 8 m a−   ( ) 46 / 21 m a−   ( ) 23 / 8 m a−   () 23 / 9 m a−  
 